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1 Introduction
My aim in this paper is to sketch, with a broad brush and in bare outlines,
an approach to modal epistemology that is characterized by three distinctive
features.
First, the approach is agency-based : it locates the roots of our modal
thought and knowledge in our experience of our own agency. Section 2
will argue that simply by being agents in the world, we possess a wealth of
modal knowledge, more specifically: knowledge about our own abilities and
dispositions as well as the dispositions and affordances of objects around us.
Second, the approach is ambitious in that it takes the experience of certain
modal properties in agency to be the sole distinctive feature of specifically
modal thought and knowledge; everything that we know about modality
beyond the experience of agency is a matter of applying standard methods
of inquiry such as deduction, induction and abductive methods for choos-
ing between theories.1 Section 3 will sketch how this works for our ordinary
modal thought; section 4 will turn to modal thought and knowledge in philo-
sophical contexts.
A third feature of the account arises naturally out of the first two. Given
that modal thought and knowledge starts with modal properties, and that
our methods for expanding modal knowledge beyond the context of agency
do not make a distinctive addition to it, it is natural that modal thought
and knowledge in general is, first and foremost, about modal properties
that are sufficiently like those encountered in agency. I call such modal
properties “potentialities” and have provided a non-reductive metaphysics
of them elsewhere (Vetter 2015), but for present purposes we can think of
them as de re possibilities. A complete version of the account will have to
specify how from there we get to knowledge of de dicto modal truths; in this
1I prefer this term to the better-entrenched ‘uniform’, for reasons to be discussed below.
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paper I will only be able to sketch an epistemology for de re modality, but
unlike Roca-Royes (2017), I am optimistic that it can be extended.
What are the attractions of such an account? I take it that if the basic
claim is correct and we do have a route to modal thought and knowledge
in our experience of agency, then this constitutes a natural starting point
for an empiricist account of modal thought and knowledge. Why make the
account ambitious, and not allow for other distinctive sources of our modal
thought and knowledge? Simply for reasons of theoretical parsimony: if
we can do without other sources, then we should. But the present paper
should be read as an exploration, rather than as a defense, of this ambitious
approach. If it fails, then we will still have learned something about the role
that the experience of agency can, and the roles that it can’t, play in modal
epistemology.
The remainder of this introductory section aims to locate the account to
be explored in the landscape of modal epistemology more generally.
Modal epistemologies can be categorized along a number of dimensions;
I will choose those which I believe best help to situate the present account.
First, exceptionalism vs anti-exceptionalism. An exceptionalist modal
epistemology claims that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has an
exceptional source, a source whose specific function is insight into questions
of metaphysical necessity and possibility. An anti-exceptionalist claims the
opposite: our modal knowledge arises, in some way or another, from cogni-
tive abilities that we use for other, more mundane purposes, such as planning
our actions. Following Williamson 2007, anti-exceptionalists will typically
claim that an exceptionalist theory would have to endow us with cognitive
faculties for which there is no plausible evolutionary explanation.
I will here simply assume that an anti-exceptionalist account is to be
preferred if we can get one. In fact, it is not clear that anyone in the
literature is a self-described exceptionalist; exceptionalism is generally at-
tributed to a view by its opponents. But an account can be more or less
obviously anti-exceptionalist. The view I will explore is very obviously an
anti-exceptionalist one – what could be less exceptional than our experience
as agents in the world?
Second, monism vs dualism. This distinction concerns the relation be-
tween metaphysical and some kind of epistemic modality, in particular, con-
ceivability.2 Monists believe that there is but one phenomenon, modality, of
2“Epistemic modality” is ambiguous. In linguistics and the philosophy of language, it
is typically used to apply to ordinary modals used to convey, roughly, that something is
compatible or not with the contextually salient state of knowledge, as when a detective says
“Jones must be the murderer”; see Kratzer 1981. In the literature on modal epistemology,
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which metaphysical and epistemic modality are merely aspects; there is only
one “space of possible worlds”. This is particularly vivid in two-dimensional
semantics, on which an epistemic kind of possibility (“primary possibility’)
and metaphysical possibility (“secondary possibility’) are characterized by
two perspectives on the one modal realm – by whether a given possible world
is considered as actual or as counterfactual. (See Chalmers 2010, Chalmers
2012). Dualists, on the other hand, hold that there is a deep distinction
between any epistemic modality on the one hand, and metaphysical modal-
ity on the other: the one concerns the extent of our knowledge, the other
concerns objective features of reality itself. Dualists will, accordingly, de-
velop their accounts of metaphysical modality with little or no regard to
such epistemically modal phenomena.
In principle, these alternatives can be freely combined. In practice, those
who put much weight on their modal anti-exceptionalism are typically du-
alists (Williamson 2007, Williamson 2016b), but an anti-exceptionalist can
be a monist as well. The clearest statement that I know of of an anti-
exceptionalist monism is Ichikawa 2016. Ichikawa’s argument for monism
starts from modal semantics, where objective modality (of which metaphys-
ical modality is a species) and epistemic modality are typically considered
merely different sets of restrictions on one space of possible worlds. For
reasons given in Viebahn and Vetter 2016, §5.2, I doubt that this is the best
account of our modal language: modals, I believe, are polysemous between
epistemic and objective readings. Thus I take modal dualism to be encoded
in modal semantics already (which is not, of course, proof of its truth, but
merely a rejoinder to semantic arguments for its falsity). Hence my ac-
count will follow the more widespread combination of anti-exceptionalism
and modal dualism.
A third distinction is that between modal empiricism and modal ratio-
nalism: while empiricism takes our modal knowledge to have its source in
our empirical knowledge of the world (using perception, induction, and so
forth), modal rationalism takes it to be non-empirical – be it a priori insight,
conceptual knowledge, or linguistic understanding. The distinction is not
exclusive: there are a variety of mixed views, which hold that our modal
knowledge has both empiricist and rationalist sources. Full-blown modal
empiricists are, of course, committed to anti-exceptionalism (what could be
it is often used to apply to conceivability – compatibility, we might say, not with our
state of knowledge but with any rational state of knowledge. The two phenomena are
presumably related, but they are not the same. For present purposes, we can lump them
together to contrast with objective modality, which is entirely independent from our or
any potential knowledge.
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less exceptional a source of knowledge than empirical methods?), but not
vice versa; an anti-exceptionalist rationalist or defender of a mixed view
might, for instance, locate the source of some or all of our modal knowledge
in our ordinary understanding of language (Thomasson 2018). It goes al-
most without saying that my proposed account will be empiricist; but as we
shall see below, it leaves room for the possibility of innate modal knowledge
(albeit not of the kind that the rationalist typically appeals to).
Fourth, a modal epistemology may be symmetric, giving equal weight
to our knowledge of different modalities (necessity, possibility and perhaps
the counterfactual conditional) or asymmetric, starting out with one kind of
modality and treating our knowledge of others as derivative (see Hale 2003).
In the latter case, depending on which kind of modality it starts with, an
account may be possibility-based, necessity-based or counterfactual-based.
The most prominent account which, like mine, combines anti-exceptionalism,
empiricism, and modal dualism is no doubt the counterfactual-based ac-
count provided by Williamson 2007. My account differs from his in being
possibility-based. Like Roca-Royes (2017), I take de re possibility to be a
more natural starting point for thought about metaphysical modality (see
also Vetter 2016).
In the recent literature, a distinction is also sometimes drawn between
uniformism and non-uniformism (Vaidya 2015, Wirling 2020), where the
former holds and the latter denies that ‘there is only one single route to
modal knowledge at the most fundamental level of explanation’ (Vaidya
2015). In identifying the source of modal knowledge in agency alone, my
account would seem to be a uniform one. But I am not committed to our
using a single method or faculty in acquiring that modal knowledge; as we
shall see, perception as well as introspective phenomenology may play a role,
and some of the modal knowledge I argue for in section 2.1 might even be
innate. Hence my preference for the label ‘ambitious’ over ‘uniform’.
Having situated and motivated the view, let me now start to develop
it. The view, as I have said in the beginning, will be painted with a broad
brush; a detailed development would require more space than I have here
(but I hope to give one in future work). I will not here argue that the view
is superior to all or indeed any of its competitors. My aim is to lay it out
as a serious although as yet underdeveloped option in the epistemology of
modality.
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2 Modality in action
2.1 Preconditions for action
When we perform an action – such as raising a hand, moving a cup on the
table, or reading a paper – there are typically both internal and external
preconditions for performing that action. On the internal side – internal,
that is, to the agent – there is the ability to perform the action in ques-
tion: to raise one’s hand, move a cup, or read a paper. I am using the
term “ability” here in the sense of an intrinsic property of the agent, what
is sometimes called a “general ability” (Maier 2010) or a “narrow ability”
(Vihvelin 2013, 11). On the external side – intuitively, outside the agent,
in their environment – there are (inter alia) the corresponding properties of
the objects on which the agent acts, or with which the agent interacts: the
cup’s being such that it can be moved, the paper’s being such that it can be
read. Those latter properties are often discussed under the label affordances
(Gibson 1986): the cup affords moving, the paper affords reading. Affor-
dances are generally taken to be relative to an agent and her abilities. Thus
the cup is movable for me but not for a newborn, this paper is readable for
you but not for someone not fluent in English. Affordances will generally
have a basis both in the intrinsic properties of the object that has them
(the cup’s size, shape, and weight) and the relation in which it stands to an
agent (the size relative to the grip of my hand, the weight relative to my
bodily strength, the distance from me and its relation to my arm length).
I will use the term “affordances” for such properties, but without thereby
committing either to a full-blown metaphysics of them, or to the role they
play in so-called ecological psychology, following Gibson. Affordances are
simply part of what constitutes an opportunity for an agent to act.
In this section, I want to argue that not only are there such abilities and
affordances when we act, but qua agents, we have rather basic knowledge
of them. (See Strohminger 2015 for a similar point.) Note that I do not
here aim to answer the question how we come to have such knowledge; some
suggestions on answering that question will be made in section 2.2, but I
hope to have more to say on this in future work.
Suppose that I want to drink some tea, and I know that the mug in
front of me contains tea. It is the easiest thing in the world for me to
extend my hand, grasp the mug, move it to my mouth and drink the tea
contained in it. But now suppose that I had no knowledge (or otherwise
true representations) of my own abilities and opportunities – of the options
available to me. How would I know what to do to fulfil my desire for tea,
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given the mug of tea in front of me – how would I know to extend my hand
and grasp the mug, rather than try to extend my lips or to move the mug
telepathically towards my mouth? How would I know to grasp the mug
while lifting it rather than try to balance it on a finger, or merely touch it
and pull it through adhesion? Of course, I could try to do those things and,
seeing that they fail, try to extend my hand instead. But that, clearly, is
not what we do. If it were, our simplest actions would be chaotic guesswork,
not to mention a lot more time-consuming. In performing a simple action
such as drinking a cup of tea, we are already guided by our awareness of
our own abilities (I am able to extend my hand and grasp the mug, but not
to extend my lips or move things telepathically) and of the opportunities
that things offer to us (the mug can be grasped, but not pulled by merely
touching it).3
From an evolutionary standpoint, too, it is unsurprising that our per-
ception is geared towards properties that are relevant for our actions – what
we can do to the things around us, what they can do to us, how we can in-
teract with our environment (see Nanay 2011, 319). Thus we should know,
without much time-consuming calculation, that we can eat the apple, that
the tiger can eat us, that we can fit into the cave ahead while the pursuing
tiger cannot, or that our friend can help us reach the apple on the high tree.
It is an interesting – and largely empirical – question exactly how such
knowledge is acquired. I cannot go into this question here. What matters is
that there is clear evidence, both empirical and reflective, that we do have
access to the properties I have described – properties that concern what the
objects in our environment can do, and what we can do to and with them –
and that this access is related to our being agents in the world. Moreover,
the processes that we use to acquire such access to particular properties,
be it perceptual, inferential, or anything else, seem at least in some aspects
hard-wired; we all learn about such properties, no matter the differences
in the environments that we are brought up in (see Gibson and Pick 2000,
178). If we did not, then acting in the world would be practically (albeit
not metaphysically) impossible.
Let me stress again that my considerations in this sections do not show
how we have the modal knowledge required for agency. For all I am say-
ing here, that knowledge – or a tendency to acquire it on the basis of very
little evidence, very early on – may be innate. Rather than answering the
3Infants may well start out with something like the ‘chaotic guesswork’ I have gestured
at in the main text; it is known as ‘exploratory activity’. Its function is precisely to
acquire the kind of knowledge – of their own abilities and the affordances offered by their
environment – that is needed for goal-directed agency. See Gibson and Pick 2000.
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question, ‘how do we get any modal knowledge?’, the considerations of this
section seek to dispel the idea that often underlies this question: that modal
knowledge is something very surprising and difficult, something that must
come on top of our more basic non-modal knowledge. If I am right, then we
always (or, at any rate, at a very basic stage) already have (some) modal
knowledge. The question how we get it is an interesting one, but not one
to be answered from the armchair. (As Nolan 2017 recommends, we must
go naturalist and look to developmental psychology for answers.) Another
important question remains, however: how do we get modal knowledge be-
yond that which is required for agency? The next section will suggest that
agency can play a role in answering that question too.
2.2 The phenomenology of action
We have seen, so far, that we need to have some knowledge of both our own
abilities and the affordances or similar properties of the objects around us,
in order to act in the purposive, coordinated way that we do.
In this section, I want to focus on slightly higher-level ways of gaining
knowledge about our own abilities and opportunities, which are not pre-
conditions for, but rather arise from, our agency in the world. I want to
suggest that the very phenomenology of agency provides further routes of
access to modal properties, such as abilities and dispositions. My first case
concerns the experience of our own dispositions; the second case concerns
the experience of our own skill; the third case concerns the experience of
resistance and the associated practical impossibility.4
First: the experience of our own dispositions. This comes in two va-
rieties: the experience of exercising a disposition, and the experience of
resisting a disposition. The first is a way of accessing a modal property
through its manifestation; the second provides access also to not or not fully
manifested modal properties.
Character traits seem to involve, even if perhaps they are more than
just, dispositions (see Alvarez 2017). In addition, agents possess various
dispositions which may be too specific to qualify as character traits: the
disposition to eat too much chocolate, to forget birthdays, to get angry, to
whistle when nervous. Such dispositions, I suggest, can be experienced in
two ways: as we exercise them, and as we resist their exercise.
4The reader may wonder at this stage how my appeal to phenomenology sits with
the claim that the proposed modal epistemology is empiricist. I respond that empiricism
has always included inner experiences – Locke and Hume include ‘reflexion’ along with
‘sensation’ as a source of our impressions and ideas.
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Take any such disposition – say, loquaciousness, the disposition to talk.
When this disposition begins to manifest, there are two basic scenarios (and
many gradations in between): the agent may “go along” with it, let it
manifest, and start chattering along; or else, he may resist it (perhaps for
fear of coming across as a chatterbox, or a mansplainer) and resist the
urge to talk. Likewise for the disposition to eat too much chocolate, to
get angry, to whistle, and so forth: in each of these cases, a self-reflective
agent may notice the beginning of its exercise and go along with it, or else
exhibit self-control and resist the full-blown manifestation.5 In each case,
there is again a distinctive phenomenology: the ease of going along with
our dispositions is very much distinct and distinguishable from the effort of
resisting them. Both ease and effort can be seen as an experience of the
“pull” of the disposition towards one (kind of) behaviour; in the first case,
one is being pulled along, while in the second one is opposing the pull.
It may be objected that these experiences of ease and effort, of going
along and resisting, need not be experiences of dispositions. They might
represent something actual, say, a desire or an exertion of willpower. Even
if that represented event is in fact importantly related to the agent’s dispo-
sitions, it need not be represented as such.
My response is most straightforward in the case of resisting a disposition:
there seems to be a clear experience of the directedness of the disposition;
its pull is a pull towards an (unactualized) manifestation. Desire may pro-
vide such directedness, but it is not always involved (think of the “pull” of
irascibility); what I am after is the experience that is common to cases with
and without desire. How else should the experience be understood than in
modal terms? In the case of “going along” with a disposition, the disposition
is, of course, typically manifested (unless something interferes). But that
is not so from the start. The “going along” is also experienced as directed
towards a manifestation which is not always desired, and not present from
the start, and hence must be understood in modal terms. In short: it is the
5I am here using the terms “manifestation” and “exercise” interchangeably. Since a
disposition’s manifestation or exercise typically consists in an extended process, I am also
assuming that we can often distinguish between the partial and full manifestation of a
disposition; in the former case, the relevant process is started but not completed, while in
the latter case it is completed. Alternative views might take the relevant dispositions to
be multi-track and say, for instance, that loquaciousness already manifests in a person’s
urge to talk, while the talking itself is just another manifestation of the same disposition.
My point in the main text can be rephrased accordingly: the disposition manifests in one
“track”, and the agent notices the pull for manifestation in another “track”, which she
can then go along with or resist.
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experience of directedness, which seems implicit in feeling the “pull” of a
disposition, that supplies the modal content.
The second case I want to consider is the phenomenology of skilled action.
Compare, to start with, the following two scenarios, which most readers
are likely to have experienced for themselves. Scenario 1: at the hospital, a
physician tests your reflexes by knocking your right knee gently; your lower
right leg kicks forward. Scenario 2: sitting on a bench, you idly kick your
lower right leg forward. The two scenarios are clearly distinct even if the
overt movement is identical: the second, but not the first, constitutes an
action, an intentional movement of your leg. The two scenarios also clearly
differ in phenomenology, even disregarding the knock of the physician’s in-
strument: the second feels like a movement that is controlled and guided by
you; the first does not.6
Now think of more complex cases of skilled action: playing a piece on
the piano, swimming or cycling, drawing a picture, giving a talk. When we
perform these actions with skill (and do not suffer from distorting amounts
of self-doubt), there is a distinctive phenomenology to them: a feeling of
having things under control, of knowing what we are doing, of being in the
driving seat. Like before, we can compare the skilled action to its unskilled
counterpart, though in this case the counterpart will involve intentional ac-
tion too: hitting keys on the piano randomly or simply drawing lines on a
paper can occasionally result in the same outcome as a skilled performance
of piano-playing or drawing (this is perhaps more likely when the skilled per-
formance intentionally imitates the unskilled one); but, self-doubts or hubris
aside, the performances differ not only in such features as its repeatability.
They differ in phenomenology as well, in much the same way as the two
scenarios considered above.
I suggest that we have here, in the experience of skilled action, an ex-
perience of our own abilities in the course of their exercise. Note that this
experience differs from that which we have seen at work with dispositions.
In the case of an ability, there need be no “pull”, since we can have abilities
without having the least tendency to exercise them; hence what we experi-
ence is not related to giving in to, or resisting, a pull or urge. Instead, there
is the experience of control, of selecting among different options, of guiding
our own action towards an envisaged goal. (The phenomenology of skilled
6Such cases play a role, of course, in the philosophy of action at least since Anscombe
1957, and in more recent debates about the phenomenology of agency (see Bayne 2008,
Roessler and Eilan 2003, Mylopoulos and Shepherd forthcoming) or efficacy (Siegel 2005).
But the emphasis here is typically on the actual agency, not on the ability; and the
ramifications for modal epistemology have not, as far as I know, been noted.
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agency is a special case of what is sometimes called the ‘sense of agency’;
see, e.g., Marcel 2002. It is also closely related to what Siegel 2005 calls the
‘phenomenology of efficacy’, which Siegel speculates may be experienced as
an exercise of a power.)
Again, it may be objected that what we experience here is not the ability
– a modal property – but merely a complex of actual goings-on. These
actual processes may constitute the exercise of an ability, but the question
is not whether they do, but whether they are experienced as such. Do we
experience skilled action as the exercise of a modal property, or merely as a
particular and complex kind of behaviour?
In response, we may again point to the modal element of directedness.
In the case of dispositions, directedness comes in the form of a “pull” to-
wards a certain outcome; in the case of abilities, it comes in the form of our
own guiding our movements, or the movements of things we interact with,
towards a certain outcome. In both cases the outcome is not yet realized.
In experiencing the guiding directedness of our behaviour towards it, we are
therefore plausibly experiencing a modal element of skilled behaviour. And
I suspect that there is a great deal of other modal facts that we experience in
exercising our skill: the various options (i.e., things that we can do) among
which we select what to do; the dispositions and lower-level abilities that
are drawn on, exercised or stopped from exercising, in skillful performance;
and so on. Exactly how these are experienced, and how the relevant modal
elements are characterized, deserves much more detailed consideration than
I can give here, but I hope to have made it plausible that the exercise of
skills provides us with one route of access to our own abilities.
My third and last case concerns not possibility, but impossibility, and
relies on Schrenk (2014). (Note that Schrenk is concerned with the experi-
ence of causation, not modality; but causation, as he points out, requires a
modal element.)
Consider, again, my desire to drink some tea, and the mug in front of
me. It looks like I can lift it and drink the tea in it. But when I grasp the
mug and try to lift it, I fail: it is glued to the table. Or imagine trying to lift
a heavy weight, and failing; trying to run the last kilometre of a marathon
when you are completely exhausted, and collapsing; pushing against a wall
which won’t move. In each of these cases, it is the world (including our own
body) that resists our intentions and our attempts to act in it in particular
ways. In these cases, we do not experience a disposition pushing or pulling in
a particular direction; the direction is given by our intentions, but thwarted
by the objects involved. What we seem to experience here is not what can
be done, but rather what (in the situation) cannot be done: I cannot lift
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the mug, we cannot lift the heavy weight, run the last kilometre, or move
the wall. This “cannot” is not metaphysical impossibility, of course; it is
situational and relative to our own abilities, just like affordances are. We
might think of it as the absence of an affordance, as the absence of an ability
(an inability), or instead as something more positive: as a disposition not to
be lifted, moved, or used for running further, that is so strong as to amount
to a practical necessity.
The three cases I have sketched here provide intro- and extrospective
access to our own abilities and dispositions as well as those of objects around
us that arises in, rather than being a precondition for, acting. Together
with the, perhaps more basic, knowledge that section 2.1 argued we must
have, this provides a rich basis for modal thought and knowledge in our
experience as agents. I believe that this is a highly promising starting point
for modal epistemology; but it is no more than a starting point. A first
potential problem is that the properties that we have looked at especially
in this section seem to be much richer than mere possibilities. How then do
they provide access to just that: mere possibility? That is the issue to be
addressed in the next section.
2.3 Towards mere possibility
In the previous section, I have argued that our experience as agents provides
us with quite straightforward and easy access to certain modal properties:
our own abilities and dispositions, as well as the affordances (and lacks
thereof) of objects in the world around us. But does it thereby provide us
with access to modality itself? The properties that I have pointed to are,
of course, modal properties: they involve unactualized possibilities or, in
the terms of my preferred metaphysics, potentialities. But they also involve
more than mere possibility, or potentiality. To have an ability is not just to
have a potentiality; it is to have a certain amount of control over its exercise.
To have a disposition, too, is not just to have a potentiality; it is to have
a certain tendency to exercise that potentiality. (The case of affordances is
less clear, and I will take it up in a moment.)
In the philosophical literature, both dispositions and abilities are stan-
dardly linked with something much stronger than a possibility: a counterfac-
tual conditional. To have a disposition, on this view, is not just to possibly
behave in a certain way, but to be such that one would behave in such a
way if certain conditions held. To have an ability, on a similar view, is
not just to possibly do something, but rather to be such that one would do
that thing if one intended, chose, or tried to do it. A similar analysis has
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been extended to affordances (Scarantino 2003). I have argued against all
three counterfactual views in different places (see Vetter 2013 and Vetter
2014 for dispositions, Vetter 2019 and Jaster and Vetter 2017 for abilities,
and Vetter 2018 for affordances). But even if, as I have suggested, we think
of these modal properties as more possibility-like than counterfactual-like,
the problem remains that they seem to involve more than mere possibility;
and that, for this reason, they do not conform to some basic principles that
philosophers have taken to be constitutive of possibility. One such principle,
which is often referred to in the epistemology of modality (e.g., Roca-Royes
2017, Hanrahan 2017), is the inference from actuality to possibility, known
as axiom (T) in modal logic. But neither abilities nor dispositions seem to
validate this inference.
For abilities, the case has been argued by Kenny (1976). As Kenny
points out, “a hopeless darts player may, once in a lifetime, hit the bull, but
be unable to repeat the performance because he does not have the ability to
hit the bull.” (Kenny 1976, 214). A one-off success does not entail ability,
since ability requires a certain sort of control, which typically results in the
reliability and repeatability of performances. And so, actuality does not
entail ability.
With dispositions, the issue is not control but rather strength: a dis-
position is not just a matter of mere possibility, but of a certain positive
probability or tendency. Thus things can break without being fragile, i.e.
disposed to break: a sturdy bridge may break when coming under enormous
stress, thus falsifying the inference from actuality to disposition.
Is this a problem for taking abilities, dispositions, and affordances to
provide our entry point to metaphysical modality? I think not, for the story
I have told in section 2 does put other modal properties at our epistemic
disposal, properties that are akin to mere (albeit, of course, restricted) pos-
sibilities. These include some affordances, especially those related to risk:
to see (or otherwise recognize) that a cliff “affords falling off” seems to in-
volve the recognition of no more than a possibility, albeit restricted and
situational, of one’s falling off that cliff. And affordances that are related
to opportunity rather than risk may exhibit the same structure: even an
imcompetent darts player will be able to recognize that a dart board af-
fords scoring a bull’s eye to her, while the wall to which it is attached does
not; and that recognition seems veridical. This may seem to suggest that
affordances are not as closely related to abilities as I made it look in sec-
tion 2.1. But in fact, we can question whether the observations concerning
abilities and dispositions really hold with full generality. There is certainly
a sense in which even an incompetent darts player has the ability to hit
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the bull’s eye, while a dolphin, say, does not. (This point is well-rehearsed;
see Lewis 1976.) An ability in this more liberal sense plausibly satisfies the
T axiom, and it is as important for action as the more demanding kind of
ability invoked in Kenny’s counterexample: we often find ourselves in sit-
uations where we attempt to perform actions without having reliable skill
(not least in the course of practising to acquire the skill, or because there
are no better options), and even there it will be useful to recognize what we
can (in principle) and what we can’t do. Likewise, there are certainly some
cases that we may classify as dispositions, and which do not come with a
strong tendency to manifest. Contrast “x is fragile” with “x is breakable”:
the former is not, but the latter arguably is, entailed by “x breaks” (though
we may have to adjust tenses). Is breakability, then, not a disposition? I
am not sure that we have circumscribed the extension of “disposition”, a
philosophical term of art, with sufficient precision to answer this question.
What is more important is that such properties are relevant for action: a
sturdy bridge’s breakability, for instance, may well be relevant to the actions
of the workers tasked with its demolition, and recognized by them as such
for the reasons given in section 2.1.
Whatever exactly we want to say about abilities and dispositions, then,
the story I have told so far does allow for properties that seem to correspond
to mere, albeit of course restricted or relativized, possibilities. Some of the
modal properties that we have access to qua agents involve more than mere
possibility; and it was these additional features, the element of activity or
control in (some) abilities, and the element of “pull” towards a manifes-
tation in (some) dispositions, that I have appealed to in section 2.2. The
considerations of section 2.1 made no such appeal, however, and we have
now seen why – since no such additional elements need be present.
A question that remains is how it is that we manage to subsume all
these different modal properties under a common concept of possibility (or
potentiality), expressed by, say, “can”. I suspect that this is a matter of
recognizing the similarity between the mere-possibility cases that we are fa-
miliar with (as I have just argued), and the more complex cases encountered
in the phenomenology of agency, and exercising our general capability for
recognizing common genera among our concepts – abstracting away, in this
case, from their differentiating features such as the element of control, the
pull towards manifestation, and our activity or passivity in their exercise,
and recognizing the shared element of (potentially) unmanifested possibil-
ity. But here, again, I venture into territory that will need a more empirical
basis. What I hope to have shown is that there are no obvious principled
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philosophical obstacles to a route such as the one I have envisaged, from our
experience in agency to a concept of mere possibility or potentiality.
3 Modality beyond action
3.1 Projection
In the previous section, I have addressed one dimension of generalizing from
the results of section 2, by abstracting from the more specific features of
abilities, dispositions etc. to their common status as possibilities, or poten-
tialities, thus also allowing for the inference from actuality to possibility. In
this section, we will generalize in a different and more obvious dimension.
The modal judgements that can be accounted for as either preconditions for,
or implicit in the phenomenology of, action form an interesting but clearly
a narrow subclass of our modal judgements in general. Starting as I have
claimed we do from modal knowlege in the context of agency, how do we gain
knowledge of possibilities that are not of direct relevance to our actions?
My general response to this question will be: in just the same ways in
which we gain knowledge of other properties that go beyond the context of
our direct interaction with objects. There is no special method to modal
knowledge. What makes it modal knowledge is its starting point, as sketched
in section 2. To use terminology from Vaidya and Wallner 2018, once we
have entered modal space, we navigate it in the same way in which we
navigate any epistemic space.
So much for the general gist of my response; now let me be a little more
specific.
A first point to notice is that the access to modality that has been
sketched in section 2 is not, of course, limited to contexts in which we do act.
With the exception of those modal judgements that arise from experience
of one’s own action, the knowledge of modal properties that was argued for
in section 2.1 will be present whether or not we act on it; one function of
such modal knowledge is to provide us with knowledge of the options among
which we can choose in our actions.
A second more wide-ranging point is that we naturally tend to project
our experience of objects beyond the context of our interaction with them,
i.e., to perform what can be rationalized as inductive reasoning. This is a
familiar point that requires no argument in the case of perceptual knowledge.
Having looked at an apple and seen that it is red, we will project this
judgement beyond the situation in which we made the sensory experience
(asked about the apple’s color an hour later, I will respond without looking
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that it is (now) red) and beyond the particular object of which we had
sensory experience (having seen many red apples, I will take apples in general
to be red). My point is simply that this same tendency naturally applies
to our attribution of modal properties to objects as well. Having looked at
a mug and recognized (perceptually or otherwise) that it can break, I will
project this judgement beyond the situation in which I had the experience
(asked about the mug an hour later, I will respond without looking that it
can (now) break) and beyond the particular object of which I had sensory
experiences (having recognized many mugs as breakable, I will take mugs in
general to be breakable).
Such projections are presumably basic to our psychology, and most of the
time happen unconsciously. Epistemologically, they will count as justified
– and in the best cases as knowledge – if the ways in which we arrive at
them correspond, explicitly or (more often) implicitly, to sound reasoning.
Sound reasoning, in turn, is typically understood to be good inductive and
abductive reasoning; reasoning by similarity, analogous reasoning, and the
use of the imagination (to be discussed in more detail in a moment) will
certainly also play a role.
Moreover, once we go beyond the context of our own actions, first-hand
experience is of course not required for modal knowledge. We can learn what
things can do by testimony, just as we can learn what things actually do by
testimony. Children certainly acquire a great deal of modal knowledge in this
way: they learn that the stove can burn them (no matter how harmless it
looks), or that drinking the washing-up liquid can make them sick (no matter
how drinkable it looks), all – ideally – without any first-hand experience of
the respective properties.
3.2 Imagination
So far, I claim, there is nothing special about modal knowledge. We project
properties from our experience of and interaction with objects to those and
other suitably related objects in situations where we do not experience and
interact with them.
But I have so far said nothing about what may well be the most promi-
nent way of gaining modal knowledge, among rationalists and empiricists
alike: the imagination. According to Tim Williamson, “[a]t least metaphor-
ically, one might regard imagination as a form of attention to possibilities”
(Williamson 2016a, 115).
Surely imagining is important to our gaining knowledge of possibilities.
But the imagination has epistemic functions other than alerting us to pos-
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sibilities.7 We arguably use it to gain knowledge of other people’s state of
mind (see, e.g., Church 2016) – whether they are actually, not just poten-
tially, happy or sad, jealous or nostalgic, anxious or angry. We use it to gain
knowledge and understanding of the past: in order to know whether my son
had lunch today, it will help to imagine what his day was like and whether
there was enough time in it to sit down and eat; in order to understand the
French revolution, it may be useful to imagine the life conditions in Paris in
the second half of the 18th century; in order to better understand the inten-
tion of a text, it may help to imagine the historical situation in which it was
written. We use it to gain knowledge and understanding of matters that are
spatially remote or occluded from perception: in order to know where the
stone that just flew past me has landed, when its destination is occluded
from me, it is useful to imagine its trajectory relative to the environment
that is being occluded; in order to know what to wear for a hike, it may
be useful to imagine the conditions of the hiking path as well as the likely
weather conditions.
In none of these examples would the knowledge to be gained with the
help of the imagination qualify as modal knowledge. None of the examples
are unusual. So it is clear that the imagination has epistemic functions that
go beyond the attaining of modal knowledge. Before we turn to the use that
it unquestionably has in attaining modal knowledge, two points about these
non-modal case bear noting.
First: in none of the examples I have given does the imagination do the
epistemic work on its own; imagining is merely one among several activities
that are used to ascertain the truth or falsity of a proposition (such as that
my son has had lunch today, or that the stone landed in the window).
Second: in each of the examples I have given, the imagination must be
constrained in some way to do the work it does. It will be no help if I
imagine my son’s schedule differently from how it is, the living situations
in 18th-century France as akin to those today, or the stone as bouncing off
objects like a rubber ball. All of these seem to be imaginable, and may well
be imagined in other contexts (thinking about improving the schedule at
7I do not here assume any particular conception of imagination. What I say is so general
that I believe it holds for any sense of ‘imagination’ that modal epistemologists have
appealed to. Note, however, that I am here still concerned with the role of imagination
for ordinary modal knowledge, not for knowledge of remote metaphysical possibilities.
Thus my cases will be more relevant to the modal empiricist’s ideas of imagination, which
tend to start from such ordinary cases, than to the modal rationalist’s, which tend to start
with a priori conceivability. See Jackson (2016) for a useful clarification of the notions
involved.
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my son’s school, writing an alternative history of France, etc.). Amy Kind
and Peter Kung have taken considerations along these lines to give rise to
a “puzzle of imaginative use”: “How can the same activity that allows us
to fly completely free of reality also teach us something about it?” (Kind
and Kung 2016, 1) Kind and Kung suggest a solution to the puzzle which,
they argue, has been widely if often implicitly accepted in philosophy: the
imagination can teach us about reality if and when it is properly constrained,
that is, guided by the right kind of facts (which they spell out in some more
detail). How are we to understand that guidance? I suggest that, as a first
approximation, x’s imagining is guided or constrained by the fact that p iff
the content of x’s imagining either includes or is compatible with p because
x knows (explicitly or implicitly) that p. This accounts for my examples
above: my imagining that my son had enough time for lunch is guided
by the fact that his schedule has a long enough lunch break, and that he
generally has lunch if at all possible; my imagining of the stone’s trajectory
is guided by certain physical facts (of which I have merely implicit, “folk-
physical” knowledge); and so on. It is plausible that the epistemic value of
imagining in a given case increases with the amount of guiding knowledge
that the imagining subject has.8
If this picture is right, then imagination plays a similar role to induction,
abduction, etc.: given prior knowledge of some facts, it will generate new
knowledge if all goes well.
With all this in place, let us now turn to the role of the imagination in
modal knowledge.
I see you throw a stone, and I catch it. Holding it in my hand, I wonder
whether it could have hit the window, breaking it in the process. My imag-
inative process seems hardly different than it was in the case above, when I
wondered whether the stone did hit the window: I am guided by the stone’s
actual trajectory (up to the point where I caught it), size, and weight, as
well as the actual position of the window and other objects in its surround-
ings. Only this time, there is an actual fact – a part of the “world as it is”
– that I am ignoring: the fact that the stone did not actually land in the
window because I caught it. Instead, what seems to guide my imagination
is knowledge of certain modal facts: how things can or must behave when
thrown in a certain way.
8Perhaps we need to make some adjustments to the proposed account since some of
the guiding assumptions, such as folk physics, are false and therefore don’t qualify as
knowledge at all (Williamson 2007, 145 ff). I will leave this complication aside here.
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If we may generalize from examples like this, then the use of the imag-
ination in ascertaining possibilities is not very different from its use in as-
certaining actual truth, and the imagination is not a distinctive source of
modal knowledge (as opposed to non-modal knowledge). Its role in acquiring
modal knowledge, as well as non-modal knowledge, seems to be ampliative:
like induction, abduction, and so forth, it merely helps us expand our basic
modal knowledge beyond the confines of our direct experience. And thus
the role of the imagination in gaining modal knowledge is not, at least prima
facie, a threat to my ambitious, agency-based account. 9
4 Modality in philosophy
4.1 Unrestricted modality
So far, this paper has been all about ordinary possibilities: the possibilities
we recognize and reason about before (and whether or not) we have done
any philosophy. But modal epistemology is done not merely to understand
our ordinary modal knowledge, intriguing though it may be. It is typically
done as part of philosophical methodology, and as such it is typically con-
cerned not merely with our (ordinary) knowledge of ordinary possibilities,
but with our (ordinary or extraordinary) knowledge of unrestricted, meta-
physical possibility. What is the approach that I have sketched here to say
about that kind of modal knowledge?
My approach, as I have said at the outset, is anti-exceptionalist. The
possibilities envisaged in philosophical debates may well be extraordinary,
but our way of knowing about them will not. Metaphysical modal knowledge
is merely the continuation of ordinary modal knowledge.
Here is a picture of how we get from the more restricted ordinary possi-
bilities (I can reach the mug, you can read this paper, the window can break)
to the more “remote” cases that are of interest in much of philosophy. The
picture is due to Edgington (2004); I have sketched my version of it already
in Vetter 2016.
The idea is that we can implicitly recognize that our ordinary possibility
claims are contextually restricted in some way (without, of course, thereby
9There is an important disanalogy: when using the imagination to affirm the truth
of possibly p, the content of the relevant imaginings will typically be not the proposition
whose truth is being probed (possibly p), but rather the embedded proposition, p. I
suggest that this can be explained by a full consideration of what it is to imagine a modal
property, and might even help extend the account towards de dicto modality. But I I do
not have the space to properly address this here.
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committing to a precise view on how the restriction works – by selecting
among the possible worlds, as in standard modal semantics, or perhaps
among the potentialities, as I would prefer to say). When doing philosophy,
we generally want to relax such contextual restrictions: we are interested
not just in what qualifies as possible here, now, in this context, but in what
qualifies as possible simpliciter. Compare: when we do ontology, we appear
to implicitly recognize that our ordinary existence claims are contextually
restricted in some way. When doing philosophy, we want to relax such
contextual restrictions: we are interested in what there is not just here,
now, and saliently for the present context, but in what there is simpliciter.
So far, of course, this is just a hypothesis of how we manage to talk about
metaphysical possibility: by creating a context, in philosophical conversa-
tion, that imposes no restrictions on the possibilities expressed. But how can
we know, or have justifying grounds for, any such unrestricted possibility
claims?
The response to this question, much as my response to the similar ques-
tion of how we get to ordinary but action-transcending modal knowledge
in section 3, is very simple: we use whatever methods we have for build-
ing and comparing theories. What these methods are or should be is a
question that is quite distinct from modal epistemology proper, and so in
a sense I must remain somewhat unspecific here. The point, again, is that
what’s special about modal judgements is not how we get to the individual,
high-level philosophical judgements. It is, rather, how we got “into” the
subject-matter in the first place.
Vaidya and Wallner (2018) have distinguished between two questions in
the epistemology of modality. The “access question” asks: “how is it that
we gain access to or acquire epistemic standing for beliefs about modality,
such as that it is possible for x to be F?” (Vaidya and Wallner 2018, 1).
The “navigation question”, on the other hand, asks: “how we can reason
with justification from one kind of modality to another, say from logical to
metaphysical to physical modality?” (Vaidya and Wallner 2018, 2) Within
the context of the approach sketched here, the relevant navigation question
is: how can we reason with justification from ordinary modality (as dis-
cussed in section 3) to metaphysical modality? My answer to the access
question should be clear: we gain access to modality through our experience
as agents in the world. My response to the navigation question is, in a sense,
uninteresting: we do whatever we do when we start to think about things
in metaphysics. The aim of this section is to further clarify and motivate
this uninteresting response.
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My approach is in effect a species of a popular kind of account of meta-
physical modality, according to which metaphysical modality differs from
ordinary modality by being “absolute”, or the “broadest” kind of objective
modality. Like other such views, however, it faces a challenge: how can
metaphysical modality be absolute, or the broadest, or the widest, kind of
objective modality, when it is more restricted than logical modality? How,
in other words, would my ‘unrestricting’ of context not lead to something
wider than metaphysical modality? My basis for modal thought and knowl-
edge is very narrow, and we have to generalize a great deal if we are to get
from there to metaphysical modality. How should we know to stop at the
metaphysical possibilities? Why not generalize further, and include meta-
physical impossibilities such as water’s being XYZ? (See Clarke-Doane 2017,
Clarke-Doane 2019, Mallozzi 2019b.)10
To begin responding to the challenge, let us reconsider the analogy with
ontology. When we do ontology, I said, we drop contextual restrictions
and ask what there is simpliciter. This is not to say that anything goes,
of course: one can adopt my picture of what we do in ontology while still
holding a very restrictive view on what there is simpliciter. We want to
drop contextual restrictions, but not change the topic: we want to know
what exists, in the same sense of ‘exists’ that we use when we contextually
restrict our quantifiers. The same holds for modality: when we think about
metaphysical modality, I suggest, we drop all contextual restrictions and ask
how things could have been simpliciter. But again, this is not to say that
anything goes. We drop contextual restrictions, but we do not change the
topic. We want to know how things could have been, in the same sense of
‘could’ that we used when we were speaking with contextual restrictions.
We are looking for the widest extension of that which we started from –
modal properties of objects, as they were presented to us in agency – not
for the widest extension of anything that one might want to call ‘modality’.
In the next section, I want to argue that there are some natural bound-
aries for the extension of our modal concepts which are relatively (though not
entirely) independent of specific theories. As it happens, these boundaries
correspond nicely to some common views in the metaphysics of modality.
10Clarke-Doane is concerned not just to argue that we cannot simply think of metaphys-
ical modality as absolute modality, but also that it is a mistake to attribute to metaphys-
ical modality “unique metaphysical significance” (Clarke-Doane 2017, passim). As should
become clear in section 4.3, this is a point on which I may well agree with Clarke-Doane.
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4.2 Boundaries
In this section, I want to consider three kinds of potential boundaries that
we may face in extending our understanding of modality from the ordinary
cases discussed in sections 2-3.
First: Meaning and analyticity. Without providing a theory of what
it is exactly that we know about in paradigmatic cases, we can recognize
that we are dealing with modal properties of some sort, and thus with (what
seem to be) objective features of reality – and not a phenomenon that is
conceptual, linguistic, or even logical in nature. Modality as we get to know
it in agency is about things, not names; about how things are, not how we
describe them. And if this is so, then modality should not be sensitive to
how things are being described. If it’s possible that this thing is so-and-so,
then it’s possible however we name the thing, and however we express being
so-and-so.
This gives us referential transparency for directly referential expressions,
i.e. expressions that contribute nothing but their reference to the truth con-
ditions of a sentence. Proper names such as “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”
are plausibly such directly referential expressions. Thus if it is possible for
Hesperus to host life, it is possible for Phosphorus to host life – because the
possibility concerns the object referred to, Venus, and not the names used
to refer to it. And if Hesperus couldn’t fail to be Hesperus, then Hesperus
couldn’t fail to be Phosphorus. In other words: it is necessary that Hesperus
is Phosphorus; and parallel reasoning leads us to the necessity of identity
in other standard cases. The same reasoning holds when we insert natural
kind terms, such as “water” and “H2O”, assuming a Kripkean semantics for
them.
We also get the necessity of analytic truths (if there are any). If, say,
“‘vixen” just means “female fox”, then any possibility that concerns being
a vixen also concerns being a female fox, and vice versa. After all, the
possibilities concern the properties ascribed with such expressions (or, more
nominalistically speaking, they concern what things are like when they are
vixens or female foxes); they do not concern the expressions we use to ascribe
such properties. In particular, if nothing can be a vixen without being a
vixen, then nothing can be a vixen without being a female fox. In other
words: it’s necessary that all vixens are female foxes; and similarly for other
textbook analyticities.
Second: Essence. Some philosophers believe (and others don’t) that
there is such a thing as the essence of an object x, what it is to be x;
and, perhaps, that there is such a thing as the essence of a property F,
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what it is to be F. If that is correct, then essence, too, plausibly imposes
certain boundaries on the extension of our modal thought beyond the initial
paradigmatic examples.
Again, without providing a theory of what it is exactly that we know
about in paradigmatic cases, we can recognize that we are dealing with
modal properties of objects. And the modal properties of an object, x, are
plausibly constrained by what it is to be x. If what it is to be Socrates
involves being human, then anything Socrates can do or be must be com-
patible with his being human; otherwise it would not be Socrates being or
doing it. How we precisify this informal consideration depends on the meta-
physics of the modal properties in question. In possible-worlds terms, we
will appeal to Socrates’s identity across worlds; in potentiality terms, to the
idea that a thing must manifest its own potentialities (see Vetter forthcom-
ing). Either way, the arguments may not be decisive, but they are highly
natural, and that is enough, I take it, to explain our inclination to let the
attribution of modal properties be constrained by the thing’s essence, if we
are inclined to attribute an essence to it.
Likewise, if what it is to be F is to be G (if the essence of being F
is that it is being G), then it would seem that any modal property that
involves being F must likewise involve being G: since if it did not, it would
not involve being F but something else instead. Thus, for instance, if what
it is to know that p is to have a justified true belief that, and if one cannot
know p without knowing p, then one cannot have a justified true belief that
p without knowing that p. (And if one can, of course, then to know cannot
just be to have a justified true belief.)
In this way, I suggest, reflection on the paradigmatic cases for our modal
thought and knowledge – the modal properties encountered in agency –
already yields some of the central philosophical claims about metaphysical
modality: the necessity of identity, of textbook analyticities, and of any
truths that are essential either objectually or generically.
How does this meet the challenge from section 4.1? It does so by show-
ing how the phenomenon that we are interested in when we extend from
the starting point sketched in sections 2-3 cannot be extended arbitrarily,
but comes with certain natural boundaries. And given certain widespread
assumptions, these boundaries can be seen to stop far short of logical or
conceptual modality. If we were to drop those boundaries, I submit, we
would no longer be generalizing on the phenomenon which we started out
with. Rather, we would be changing the topic.
Note, however, that the boundaries I have drawn were not entirely mo-
tivated by the epistemology of modality alone, and to a certain extent are
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therefore hypothetical: we can know certain modal truths by being implic-
itly guided by those constraints, if we can know the contents of those con-
straints. (That ‘if’ clause again decomposes into at least two elements: if the
constraints hold, e.g. if there really are analytic truths or essential proper-
ties; and if we have the right kind of epistemic access to them.) Accordingly,
being guided by these constraint requires knowledge of essential properties,
analytic truths, and so forth. It is beyond the scope of the present proposal
to provide the relevant epistemologies here, but of course there is a host of
philosophical work on them.11
4.3 Metaphysical cases and moderate modal skepticism
In a recent paper, Amie Thomasson (2018) argues that modal empiricist
accounts like the one presented here fail to give a full account of our knowl-
edge of properly metaphysical modal claims. What makes these accounts
attractive, she points out, is their integration of modal knowledge into our
empirical knowledge of the world. Knowledge of dispositions, for instance, is
inductively justified and yields testable predictions – a far cry from the scien-
tifically suspicious methodology of questioning one’s intuitions in the arm-
chair. But, Thomasson points out, “the distinctively metaphysical modal
features at issue in characteristic metaphysical debates are cases in which
we have the very same empirical information, and same physical laws and
properties, and yet come to different modal conclusions” (Thomasson 2018,
7). She concludes that within such empiricist approaches, “there does not
seem to be the prospect of explaining how we could come to know these
distinctively metaphysical modal properties” (Thomasson 2018, 8).
The approach I have developed here, at first look, seems to underwrite
Thomasson’s conclusion: starting from abilities, affordances, dispositions,
and some generalizations from them certainly does not directly address such
metaphysical modal claims as: the lump of clay can, while the statue can-
not, survive squashing; my body can, but I cannot, survive a complete
and irreparable memory loss (these are Thomasson’s examples); there could
be a molecule-for-molecule replica of me that lacked my conscious experi-
11For knowledge of essence, see for instance Vaidya 2010, Mallozzi 2019a). – In Vetter
forthcoming, I suggest that essence, understood in the Finean sense, is more closely related
to grounding and dependence than it is to modality. Thus I take the epistemology of
essence not to be a special case of the epistemology of modality. That is, of course, a
controversial claim, and those who disagree with it will justifiedly ask for my proposed
modal epistemology to be supplemented with an epistemology of essence.
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ences; the universe could have consisted of nothing but two indistinguishable
spheres; and so on.
One reaction that is not uncommon among modal empiricists (see Leon
2017, Kung 2017, Hawke 2017, Nichols 2006) is to adopt what van Inwa-
gen (1998) has called “modal skepticism”, a skepticism of a very moderate
kind that allows us knowledge of reasonably close and everyday possibilities
and necessities, as well as some straightforward cases such as the necessity
of logical, conceptual and mathematical truths, but denies that we have
any reliable capacity to acquire knowledge of the more remote metaphysical
possibilities, such as those involving philosophical zombies, indistinguishable
sphere-universes, and the like.
The approach that I have been exploring here is not committed to modal
skepticism. It does, however, curtail the role that modal thought and knowl-
edge can play in metaphysics (and other areas of philosophy).
The approach is not committed to modal skepticism because it poses no
limits on the methods we can use to gain modal knowledge. Basic modal
knowledge is empirical (in a broad sense), to be sure; but most modal knowl-
edge is not basic, and can be highly theory-driven. Thus we can learn about
the possibilities mentioned above by utilizing our best philosophical theo-
ries, along with the modal repertoire that has arisen from our experience in
agency. This is what I have already suggested in section 4.2 that we do in
judging such cases as the necessity of identity or of essential properties. In
the cases mentioned above, we will have to use other philosophical theories,
about artifacts, persons, and the nature of modal properties. If we do so
in the right way, there is nothing that would in principle prevent us from
gaining knowledge about such cases. For instance, if our best theories of
what a person is tells us that a person is essentially tied to their memories,
then we can justifiedly conclude (by the kind of reasoning sketched in the
previous section) that I, a person, could not survive total memory loss. If
our best theories of what a person is tells us that a person is not essentially
tied to their memories, then we can justifiedly conclude that I, a person,
could probably survive total memory loss (barring other considerations that
would foreclose such a possibility). If our best theories tell us neither of
these things, then we had better remain agnostic about the possibility ques-
tion for the time being. (Here and in the next paragraph, I am very much
in agreement with Fischer 2016, though he takes a different route to get to
the same conclusion).
Thus the approach curtails the role that modal thought and knowledge
can play in metaphysics (and other areas of philosophy): it makes our modal
judgements about the relevant cases not unjustified, but dependent on ex-
24
actly the kind of theoretical choice that they are often thought to be used
for or against. If my judgement on the possibility of my surviving total
memory loss depends, and should depend, on what I think is the best the-
ory of personal identity, then that judgement can hardly serve as evidence
for such a theory, on pain of circularity. The same will hold for other cases:
modal arguments, on my approach, generally get things backwards, using
the modal judgement to argue for the theoretical judgement which it is and
should be based on.
Or so it would seem; things don’t look quite so bleak for modal argu-
ments at second blush. For assuming that we implicitly use the kinds of
considerations I have sketched in section 4.2, we can use our modal judge-
ments as evidence – not so much for the truth of the underwriting theoretical
judgement, but for our having already accepted it. Thus the fact that we all
accept Gettier’s counterexamples against the JTB analysis of knowledge is
evidence for our already, albeit implicitly, having a different view about the
nature of knowledge than the JTB analysis states. If you endorse Gettier’s
judgement about his cases constituting justified true belief without knowl-
edge, you cannot then consistently go on to claim that knowledge is justified
true belief. In this way, modal judgements can still provide a source of ev-
idence for or against our implicit acceptance of the theoretical judgements
that underwrite them. When a modal judgement is accepted unanimously,
then it teaches us something about our (often pretheoretically held) commit-
ments on the subject. But modal judgements cannot then be used in order
to forestall revisions to those commitments, as long as we revise the modal
judgements along with them. Nor are we entitled to think, on the present
approach, that there is some sort of direct access, perhaps via conceivability,
to modal truths that is theory-independent and can be used, like empirical
data, to assess theories. The approach I have sketched does not vindicate
the move from the fact that some of us can conceive of their own disem-
bodied survival, or of their own philosophical zombie-twin, to conclusions
about personal identity or about the nature of conscious experience; though
it does vindicate conclusions about the conceivers’ theoretical commitments,
implicit or explicit, about personal identity or the nature of conscious expe-
rience (and whatever may follow from their holding those commitments).
Thus the present approach vindicates modal knowledge in metaphysics,
while at the same time curtailing its usefulness. This, I take it, is the price
we pay for modal empiricism.
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